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Abstract— Security underpins Grids and e-Research. Without a 
robust, reliable and simple Grid security infrastructure 
combined with commonly accepted security practices, large 
portions of the research community and wider industry will not 
engage. The predominant way in which security is currently 
addressed in the Grid community is through Public Key 
Infrastructures (PKI) based upon X.509 certificates to support 
authentication. Whilst PKIs address user identity issues, 
authentication does not provide fine grained control over what 
users are allowed to do on remote resources (authorization). In 
this paper we outline how we have successfully combined 
Shibboleth and advanced authorization technologies to provide 
simplified (from the user perspective) but fine grained security 
for access to and usage of Grid resources. We demonstrate this 
approach through different security focused e-Science projects 
being conducted at the National e-Science Centre (NeSC) at the 
University of Glasgow. We believe that this model will be more 
widely applicable and encourage the further uptake of e-Science 
by non-IT specialists in the research communities. 
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the critical factors to the success of Grid 
technologies is ease of use. To encourage wider uptake, the 
access to large scale computational and data resources such as 
the National Grid Service (NGS) (www.ngs.ac.uk) needs to be 
made as simple as possible for the end user. Currently, the end 
user experience of interacting with such resources typically 
begins with obtaining an UK e-Science X.509 certificate 
issued by the UK Certification Authority (CA) at Rutherford 
Appleton Laboratories (RAL) (www.grid-support.ac.uk/ca). 
This can often be an arduous process, especially for non-IT 
experienced researchers, requiring them to follow a detailed 
recipe for obtaining the certificates and converting them into 
appropriate formats before they are then able to access the 
resources. There are also likely to be scalability issues with 
this approach once the number of certificate holders extends 
to the wider academic and industrial community. These 
certificates are used to support Public Key Infrastructures 
(PKI) where the trusted root of authority is the CA at RAL. 
Through trusting the process in which certificate requests are 
processed, subsequently issued and managed by RAL, single 
sign-on is achieved through recognition of these certificates 
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odes comprising the NGS. However, the security of 
n be compromised in a variety of ways, including the 
te holders not taking appropriate security measures, 
ting their private key passwords down in visible places. 
sue is further exacerbated since the private key 
ds associated with these certificates are necessarily 
For current and future sporadic users of resources such 
GS, the likelihood of forgetting complex passwords is 
d, and ad-hoc insecure practices such as writing 
ds down will occur. A better and more scaleable 
 for secure access to large scale Grid infrastructures is 
sential. Shibboleth offers one such possible solution 
hibboleth.internet2.edu/). 
K academic community is currently in the process of 
ng Shibboleth technologies to support local, existing 
s of authentication for remote login to resources. 
 this model, sites are expected to trust local security 
ctures for example in establishing the identity of users 
tication) and their associated privileges (authorisation). 
ort this, the Shibboleth architecture [1] and associated 
ls [2] identify several key components that should be 
ed including IdP, targets and optionally Where Are 
m (WAYF) services. Through these components, end 
ill have single usernames and passwords (which they 
re familiar with than PKIs!) which will provide for 
s access to a range of resources at collaborating 
ons and service providers. Local security policies at 
provider sites can then be used to restrict (authorise) 
sources authenticated users are allowed access to.  
upport the harmonisation of the Grid and Shibboleth 
 numerous issues in the current Grid based approach to 
cation and Shibboleth need to be addressed. Firstly, 
ting approach taken in controlling access to large scale 
frastructures via access control lists such as Globus 
ddleware [3] and the use of grid mapfiles needs to be 
econciled with Shibboleth components and protocols 
rnatively more scalable solutions explored and 
ed. Secondly, X.509 certificates and the associated 
curity infrastructure should ideally be managed by the 
and not left to end users. A third and major hurdle that 
be overcome in utilising Shibboleth technologies in 
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large scale Grid infrastructures like NGS is trust. Trust 
underpins the Shibboleth approach to establishing federations. 
Grid service providers like the NGS need to ensure that local 
institutions take identity provisioning and associated 
validation of identity (authentication) processes seriously.  
II. BACKGROUND TO SHIBBOLETH AND ADVANCED 
AUTHORISATION INFRASTRUCTURES
To understand the impact of Shibboleth technologies on 
Grid security it is first necessary to have an appreciation of the 
interactions that typically arise with Shibboleth. When a user 
attempts to access a Shibboleth protected service or Service 
Provider (SP) more generally, they are typically redirected to 
a WAYF server that asks the user to pick their home Identity 
Provider (IdP) from a list of known and trusted sites. The 
service provider site already has a pre-established trust 
relationship with each home site, and trusts the home site to 
authenticate its users properly.  
After the user has picked their home site, their browser is 
redirected to their site’s authentication server, e.g. an LDAP 
repository, and the user is invited to log in. After successful 
authentication, the home site redirects the user back to the SP 
and the message carries a digitally signed Security Assertion 
Markup Language (SAML) [4] authentication assertion 
message from the home site, asserting that the user has been 
successfully authenticated (or not!) by a particular means. The 
actual authentication mechanism used is specific to the IdP. 
If the digital signature on the SAML authentication 
assertion is verified and the user has successfully 
authenticated themselves at their home site, then the SP has a 
trusted message providing it with a temporary pseudonym for 
the user (the handle), the location of the attribute authority at 
the IdP site and the service provider URL that the user was 
previously trying to access. The resource site then returns the 
handle to the IdP’s attribute authority in a SAML attribute 
query message and is returned a signed SAML attribute 
assertion message. The Shibboleth trust model is that the 
target site trusts the IdP to manage each user’s attributes 
correctly, in whatever way it wishes. So the returned SAML 
attribute assertion message, digitally signed by the origin, 
provides proof to the target that the authenticated user does 
have these attributes. The attributes in this assertion may then 
be used to authorise the user to access particular areas of the 
resource site, in principle without the service provider ever 
being told the user’s identity.  
How returned attributes are used to make decisions can be 
done in numerous different ways depending upon the 
authorisation infrastructure used and the security requirements 
of the virtual organisation or service provider itself. Numerous 
authorisation infrastructures exist today [5-9]. The advantages 
and disadvantages of some of these infrastructures are 
described in detail in [10-13]. 
The Shibboleth model of security attributes being required 
to make an authorisation decision builds on the international 
X.812 Access Control Framework standard [14] which defines 
a generic framework upon which numerous authorisation 
infrastru
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137ctures can be supported. In the X.812 model, one of 
damental scenarios to be supported is where an 
 attempts to access a protected target in a remote 
. Two key components support authorised access to the 
a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) also known as an 
control Enforcement Point (AEF), and a Policy 
n Point (PDP), also known as an Access control 
n Function (ADF). The PEP ensures that all requests to 
he target are run through the PDP and the PDP casts 
orisation decision on the request based on a collection 
 (policies).  
ake this structure scalable and easily applicable within 
nvironment, a generic API [15] to model the PEP has 
oposed and created by the Authorisation Working 
f the Global Grid Forum (GGF) (www.ggf.org). The 
ation of this API is an enhanced profile of the OASIS 
v1.1 specification and defines a message exchange 
 a PEP and PDP consisting of an 
zationDecisionQuery going from the PEP to the PDP 
 returned assertion containing a number of 
zationDecisionStatements, e.g. boolean decisions 
ranted or denied.  
ugh this API, a generic PEP can be achieved which 
associated with arbitrary Grid services. Thus rather 
velopers having to explicitly engineer a PEP on a per 
ion basis, the information contained within the 
ent descriptor file (.wsdd) when the service is 
d within the container, is used. Authorisation checks 
s attempting to invoke “methods” associated with this 
are then made using this deployment information, the 
 (security policies) of the PDP, e.g. an LDAP 
ry, together with the DN of the user themselves. 
s of the Globus software since GT3.3 have supported 
I. 
authorization infrastructure that has been extended to 
 this PDP is the Privilege and Role Management 
cture Standards Validation (PERMIS) initiative 
ermis.org). PERMIS itself realises a Role Based 
Control (RBAC) authorisation infrastructure offering 
standards-based Java API that allows developers of 
 gateways (gatekeepers) to enquire if a particular 
to a resource should be allowed, as well as the less 
coupled SAML AuthZ API. RBAC systems support 
e management infrastructures (PMI).  
elationship between a PMI and authorisation is similar 
relationship between a PKI and authentication. 
uently, there are many similar concepts in the two 
f infrastructure. Central to a PMI is the idea of the 
 certificate (AC), which maintains a binding between 
 and their privilege attributes. It is similar in notion to 
lic key certificate in a PKI. The entity that signs a 
ey certificate is a CA; the entity that signs attribute 
tes is called an Attribute Authority (AA). The root of 
a PKI is often called the root CA, which can delegate 
t to a subordinate CA; the root of trust of a PMI is 
he Source of Authority (SoA). The SoA may have 
nate authorities to which it can delegate powers of 
authorisation. Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), which 
show a list of certificates that should no longer be accepted as 
valid, exist in a PKI; Attribute Certificate Revocation Lists 
(ACRLs) exist in a PMI. 
The critical idea in a PMI is that the access rights of a user 
are not held in an access control list (ACL) but in the privilege 
attributes of the ACs that are issued to the users. This is the 
central idea behind RBAC – the privilege attribute will 
describe one or more of the user’s rights and the target 
resource will then read a user’s AC to see if they are allowed 
to perform the action being requested. This de-couples the 
user’s privileges from their local identity and allows a more 
dynamic and flexible approach to access control. 
Other RBAC based authorisation infrastructures include the 
Community Authorisation Service (CAS) [5] and the Virtual 
Organization Membership Service (VOMS) [6].  The central 
idea behind CAS is that while resource providers can specify a 
coarse-grained policy, the fine-grained security policy 
decisions can be delegated to the administrator of the 
community that is served by CAS. Resource providers grant 
privileges to the community and establish a trust relationship 
with the representative of that community. That representative 
then uses CAS to manage the distribution of privileges within 
the community. When a user wants to access resources served 
by CAS, the user issues a request to the CAS server (using 
their own X509 certificate). If the CAS server decides that the 
user associated with this certificate has sufficient privileges, 
then it will issue a proxy credential with an embedded policy 
giving the user the right to perform the requested actions 
(assuming that the user has sufficient privilege). The user then 
uses these CAS credentials to access the resource. The local 
resource than applies its own local policy to determine the 
amount of access granted. Currently the primary resource that 
can be accessed through CAS credentials is gridFTP. 
VOMS is a system for managing authorisation data within 
VOs and has gained widespread acceptance by the HPC-
oriented Grid community. VOMS has been developed as part 
of the European DataGrid project (edg-wp2.web.cern.ch/edg-
wp2). The use of VOMS requires a VO administrator to create 
a separate database for the VO. Each VO user is added to this 
database and given the appropriate attributes needed to access 
resources across that VO. This necessarily places a large 
burden on each VO administrator, since not only must they 
run their own separate database, they also need to manage it 
and add all the VO members to it. 
Neither CAS nor VOMS is fully aligned with the 
Shibboleth model of security. VOMS is based upon a 
centralised server based approach whereas a more scalable, 
Grid-like model should ideally be based upon a federated 
model. PERMIS when used for specification and enforcement 
of local security policies combined with Shibboleth for 
attribute retrieval offers a model more aligned with the true 
federated model of the Grid. 
The PERMIS RBAC system itself uses XML based policies 
defining rules, specifying which access control decisions are 
to be made for given VO resources. These rules include 
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138ubjects that can be assigned roles;  
ources of Authority (SoA), e.g. local managers trusted 
o assign roles to subjects;  
oles and their hierarchical relationships;  
hat roles can be assigned to which subjects by which 
oAs;  
arget resources and the actions that can be applied to 
hem;  
hich roles are allowed to perform which actions on 
hich targets, and the conditions under which access 
an be granted to roles. 
s are assigned to subjects by issuing them with X.509 
e Certificate(s). A graphical tool called the Privilege 
r (PA) has been developed to support this process. 
oles are assigned, and policies developed, they are 
 signed by a manager and stored in one or more 
epositories. 
PERMIS infrastructure offers very fine grained 
ation capabilities both in terms of policy expression 
forcement. Policy editing tools allow for easy 
ment of the XML based policies. These tools have 
veloped with HCI considerations included, although 
 that the advanced MSc students at the University of 
 raised issues with the tools, e.g. the XML that is 
d is inconsistent with the tool user interface. For 
, the XML has attributes for “subject domain”, whilst 
 has buttons for “where are users from”. 
 support for the GGF SAML AuthZ API described 
sly, PERMIS allows easy linkage between Grid 
 and authorisation infrastructures.  
IMPACT AND CHALLENGES OF SHIBBOLETH IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE GRID
oleth offers numerous possibilities and potential 
ges in the context of the Grid. Single sign-on via 
cation at a home site and subsequent acceptance and 
tion of the authentication and associated attributes 
 to remote sites is the most obvious advantage. Thus 
eed not remember X.509 certificate passwords but 
only their own institutional usernames/passwords. 
ons can establish their own trust federations and agree 
fine their own policies on attribute release, and 
ntly SPs can decide upon what attributes and attribute 
re needed for authorisation decisions. 
ptake and adoption of Shibboleth technologies within 
context is not without potential concerns however. 
ed to be sure that collaborating sites have adopted 
iate security policies for authentication. Strength of 
swords and unified institutional account management 
ed. Shibboleth is, by its very nature much more static 
 true vision of the Grid, where virtual organisations 
can be dynamically established linking disparate 
ational and data resources at run time. Instead 
eth requires agreed sets of attributes that have been 
ed between sites.  
Ensuring that an institution in a Shibboleth federation can 
guarantee the authenticity of a user when accessing a remote 
resource is crucial to the overall principles upon which 
Shibboleth and Shibboleth federations are based. In short, 
institutions in a federation should trust one another. It is the 
case however, that users at larger institutions may well have 
numerous usernames and associated passwords that are used 
to access a variety of services. This is the case at the 
University of Glasgow for example! To address this a unified 
institutional user account management system based on nSure 
technologies (www.novell.com/solutions/nsure) which 
handles authentication and attributes is being explored in the 
GLASS project [16]. Through this system, a one to one 
representation between each user and their corresponding 
entry in the Human Resource/Registry database – the 
definitive sources for data will exist. This will support an 
agreed standard for unique identifiers for each user account 
with an agreed password policy, e.g. on password strength, 
and agreement of the definition of department/faculty codes 
where user accounts should reside. 
As well as authentication information, SPs are likely to 
need further information in order to allow (authorise) access 
to specific services. In the context of the Grid, membership of 
the University of Glasgow will not normally be sufficient 
information for a decision on access to a specific Grid service 
hosted and managed by a given VO.  
The eduPerson efforts [17] have identified a core set of 
attributes that may be of use within an academic environment. 
The JISC Blueprint for a Production Federation [18] has also 
explored some potential attributes of relevance to the UK 
academic community. A small core set of attributes is 
recommended for IdPs to support that SPs can subsequently 
use for authorisation decisions. It is essential that 
interoperability exists between attribute authorities issuing 
attribute assertions, policy writers defining access policies, 
and access decision functions that make decisions based on 
the initiator’s attributes and sites target and resource policy. 
The overlap between Grid technologies (requiring in the first 
instance attributes for identification) and Shibboleth 
technologies is required.  
The eduPerson attributes that have been recognised as 
providing the necessary core functionality for IdPs and SPs in 
the UK academic community include:  
• eduPersonScopedAffiliation: which indicates the user’s 
relationship (e.g., staff, student, etc.) with the institution;  
• eduPersonTargetedID: is needed when an SP is presented 
with an anonymous assertion only, as provided by 
eduPersonScopedAffiliation. In this situation it cannot for 
example provide usage monitoring across sessions. The 
eduPersonTargetedID attribute provides a persistent user 
pseudonym;  
• eduPersonPrincipalName: is used where a persistent user 
identifier, consistent across different services, is needed;  
• eduPersonEntitlement: enables an institution to assert that 
a user satisfies an additional set of specific conditions that 
apply for access to a particular resource. A user may 
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139sess different values of the eduPersonEntitlement
ibute relevant to different resources.  
 of these attributes can be used to provide the 
ry information to SPs to make authorisation decisions. 
ttributes are versatile and likely to be sufficient for the 
ajority of applications. Given the fact that Grids form 
ich themselves will have finer grained structuring, it 
ensible that the eduPersonEntitlement attribute can be 
r this purpose. The eduPersonEntitlement attribute can 
tructured XML data representative of large scale Grid 
cture users and IdPs. This might include the VO they 
lved in, the roles that they might have in that VO etc. 
important to note that these attributes are statically 
 and agreed upon between the institutions prior to 
tion of VOs or requests to access Grid resources, i.e. 
e based upon statically defined PMIs. The JISC 
E project [19] has developed solutions which allow 
dynamic creation and acceptance of attributes. This is 
igned with the dynamic creation of VOs across Grid 
ctures where dynamic delegation of privilege is 
ed. As the complexity and number of security policies 
s, the ability of a given SoA to delegate responsibility 
rs is necessary. Through extensions to the PERMIS 
e, DyVOSE now supports dynamic delegation of 
y whereby Grid sites can allow an attribute authority 
ed by an external SoA to be delegated the ability to 
oles meaningful to a home SoA [20]. Through this, a 
Grid user can hold a role based in their home 
on that will allow access to the potentially remote 
provider Grid resources. 
ps the biggest challenge in moving from static 
eth federations with pre-agreed sets of attributes 
the federation to more dynamic Grid-like virtual 
tions supporting dynamic PMI infrastructures with 
cific attributes being created and recognised is a 
c one. Remote policies defining rules and regulations 
s of roles, targets and actions on those remote 
s requires tool support that can facilitate the discovery, 
ion, merging and promotion or suppression of policies 
g user privileges between sites. In static delegation, the 
 the remote institution would need to be hand written 
 policy at the home institution. Dynamic delegation 
away the role assigning powers to subordinate 
ies, which may delegate the ability to assign local 
 remote attribute authorities, and vice versa. Thus a 
 “Student” role may be assigned to Edinburgh 
ing Science users, so they may access the Glasgow 
 without the Glasgow SOA knowing about any 
gh roles. This trust relationship is agreed beforehand, 
t is implicit that the role of Student at Glasgow and 
 say at Edinburgh are equivalent. Complex delegation 
new intermediate roles with less privilege than their 
 role to be defined and assigned to remote attribute 
ies. This Delegation Issuing Service to support such 
c creation and recognition of attribute certificates has 
implemented and available for use 
penpermis.org). This software is currently being used 
within the last phase of the DyVOSE project to dynamically 
link the security infrastructures used for teaching at Glasgow 
and Edinburgh universities [21,22]. 
IV. INTEGRATING SHIBBOLETH AND GRID INFRASTRUCTURES
There is much effort to reconcile the Shibboleth and Grid 
worlds. The GridShib project [23] and the two recently funded 
JISC projects: ShibGrid [24] and SHEBANGS [25] are 
exploring use of Shibboleth and Grid. The GridShib project is 
focusing upon identity federation between the Grid and 
Shibboleth communities. In real terms the GridShib project is 
looking towards Grid (GSI) based authentication followed by 
Shibboleth based retrieval of attributes for making 
authorisation decisions. It is important to note that the 
GridShib project does not directly address Shibboleth single 
sign on to Grid infrastructures. The ShibGrid and 
SHEBANGS projects are both looking at supporting scenarios 
where Shibboleth is used for single sign-on and access to the 
NGS, both with MyProxy [26] at the core. The National e-
Science Centre at the University of Glasgow has successfully 
applied and integrated Shibboleth and Grid technologies in 
several projects. We provide an overview of some of them 
here.   
We note that in all of the explorations of Shibboleth 
outlined below we have been part of the UK federation hosted 
EDINA at the University of Edinburgh (www.sdss.ac.uk).  
A. Background to DyVOSE Project 
The Dynamic Virtual Organisations for e-Science 
Education (DyVOSE) project was funded as one of the JISC 
Core Middleware projects focusing on advanced security 
infrastructures in the education domain. The basic model 
being explored in DyVOSE of sites having their own security 
authorisation policies and associated attributes is very much 
consistent with Shibboleth where there will likely be several 
authorities that assert attributes for users. Various domains 
will then write their own authorization policies based on such 
attributes.   
In teaching the Grid Computing module as part of the
advanced MSc in Computing Science at the University of 
Glasgow a thorough exploration was made of the PERMIS 
authorisation software for forming static PMIs in a Grid 
context. In detail, students were initially expected to develop 
their own security policies for a basic GT3.3 based Grid 
service which was subsequently used in their main 
programming assignment. This assignment required that the 
students were requested to create a policy for a GT3.3 service 
(searchSortGridService) which wrapped a Condor based Java 
application (this service offered two methods to search 
(searchMethod) and sort (sortMethod) a large (5MB) text file 
(the complete works of Shakespeare). The students themselves 
were split into groups (studentteam1, studentteam2) with the 
authorisation policy to ensure that method sortMethod could 
only be invoked by members of their student group and the 
lecturing staff, whilst method searchMethod could be invoked 
by ever
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140yone.  This set-up was used to illustrate the use of 
 where users are allocated privileges based on what 
y have been assigned rather than their local user 
als. The students were also requested to secure their 
using Globus GSI and also with PERMIS. 
ance aspects and benchmarks for the speed of the 
t systems were recorded by the students and are 
nted in [10].   
basic Shibboleth scenario currently supported in 
E demonstrates how the Grid based search and sort 
can be securely accessed and used via Shibboleth 
gies. Specifically it supports scenarios demonstrating 
e attributes related to users being members of 
eam1 (or studentteam2) are returned from the IdP at 
lasgow and used to restrict access to the service itself 
has been deployed as a portlet in a GridSphere web 
In supporting this scenario we have utilised the 
S Shibboleth Apache Authorisation Module (SAAM) 
 [27] which allows use of the PERMIS infrastructure 
 authorisation decisions, as opposed to the existing 
 authorisation module (mod_auth_ldap).  Currently the 
urns two attributes: the role that the student has 
eam1) and the DN. These attributes are then used and 
through the SAAM module to make authorisation 
s.  
pport the Grid aspect of this system we utilised server 
tes to overcome the issues in creation of proxy 
tes and for submission of jobs via Grid services to the 
 pool at NeSC. Thus client side certificates are not 
. Fig 1 shows the GUI and the Shibboleth attributes 
ve been returned when using the system. Here we 
 the distinguished name of the user and the attributes 
ng which role(s) the person has in this federation. 
ttributes are dynamically retrieved by the Shibboleth 
cture and used by the local security infrastructure to 
r deny access to the Grid service portlet. 
hibboleth-Protected GridSphere portal displaying user attributes 
rom the IdP 
From the user perspective, this infrastructure provides a 
simple model for access to Grid resources. Through a 
common understanding of the roles needed and basic trust 
relationships between sites, single sign-on with fine grained 
authorisation can be achieved.   
B. Background to BRIDGES Project 
The BRIDGES project (Biomedical Research Informatics 
Delivered by Grid Enabled Services [28] recently completed 
at the end of 2005 and involved the universities of Glasgow, 
Edinburgh with the industrial participation of IBM. BRIDGES 
was a core project of the UK’s e-Science Programme aimed at 
developing Grid-enabled bioinformatics tools to support 
biomedical research. The primary source of use cases in 
BRIDGES was from the Wellcome Trust funded 
Cardiovascular Functional Genomics Project (CFG) [29] - a 
large collaborative study into the genetics of hypertension 
(high blood pressure).  
BRIDGES aimed to aid and accelerate such research by 
applying Grid-based technology. This included data 
integration tools and support for compute intensive 
bioinformatics applications such as Basic Local Alignment 
Search Tool (BLAST). Solutions were developed which 
provide simplified access to and usage of range of large scale 
compute resources including all nodes of the UK National 
Grid Service, the ScotGrid cluster at the University of 
Glasgow (www.scotgrid.ac.uk), other HPC clusters at 
Glasgow University and a collection of Condor pools [30].  
One of the project requirements was that user 
authentication should not cause any additional learning or 
usability overheads for the users. Biology end users range 
widely in computer literacy and therefore systems providing a 
single mechanism for users of all abilities should aim at the 
lowest level of literacy. It was therefore decided to remove 
digital certificates from the end user environment altogether 
and replace them with simple username and password 
authentication at a central project web portal (see Fig. 2). 
Authentication at Grid sites such as the NGS is instead being 
carried out by means of a host proxy generated from the Grid 
server’s host credentials. The host’s identity is then mapped 
locally to a project account in the local grid-mapfile on the 
remote Grid nodes. Thus, all jobs run under the project’s 
identity on the NGS resources, and the logging and 
monitoring of user activity has to be moved up one level into 
the domain of the BRIDGES support staff.  
We note that whilst we have removed the need for UK e-
Science X.509 certificates from the biological end users, we 
have not omitted security. Rather, we have defined and 
enforced a much finer grained security model. For example, 
once a user has logged in to the portal, they have access to the 
complete set of tools available on the project portal. The finer 
grain control of what back end resources associated with a 
tool are accessible for a given user is implemented through the 
Grid authorisation software PERMIS. 
In the original implementation of BRIDGES as depicted in 
Fig 2, the identity of the user submitting the job was extracted 
from the portal context, and passed on with the job request. 
The Grid server sends a lookup request to a dedicated 
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141S authorisation server maintained by the project team, 
secure attribute certificates are used to store 
tion about the roles/privileges a user has.  
e computational security policies (which are enforced) 
pported: 
If they are unknown users the job will only be 
submitted to the local Condor pool (we allow anyone 
access to the portal, however we restrict what they 
are allowed to do once there).  
If we recognise the users but they do not have a local 
ScotGrid account the job will be submitted to the 
Condor pool and NGS (we currently use all of the 
NGS nodes and are helping to define the generic 
datasets and services for the wider life science 
community on the NGS).  
If we recognise the users and they have an account 
on ScotGrid then the job will be submitted 
potentially to the Condor pool, the NGS and to 
ScotGrid (based on job numbers). 
Usage of Server Certificates for Job Submission onto the Grid 
selection of where to submit jobs is based on 
lity of resources (which is established dynamically).  
del of security through portals and server certificates 
way that increased security can be achieved. It does 
ith certain constraints however on the Grid application 
ers. We are required for example to keep a track of the 
at are submitting jobs (logging of all activity through 
tal is recorded and kept). The dangers that might 
se arise with usage of server certificates for job 
ion by anonymous end users (from the point of view 
rid resources the jobs are submitted to), are minimal 
r. Users that have successfully authenticated 
ves at the portal via a username and password are 
cess to a fixed set of portlets such as the Grid BLAST 
 Should a security breach occur and another 
rading user has managed to authenticate at the portal 
e, the worst that can occur is that they will be allowed 
any BLAST jobs for example.  
solution is unlikely to be suitable for many Grid 
ers who need to compile and tinker with their codes 
on the Grid resources. However there are many other 
researchers (not explicitly Grid-researchers) that require 
simple, secure access to large scale Grid infrastructures to run 
known services. Given the number of UK e-Science 
certificates that have been issued (approx. 3500), it is clear 
that simpler services tailored to the scientific community with 
minimal/no Grid learning or overheads are needed to engage 
with the much larger research communities. For example, 
there are over 3 million Athens accounts from over 2000 
organisations across UK academia. BLAST is one example of 
such a service. There are likely to be many other such 
solutions both within the life science as well as other research 
communities. 
The Shibboleth enabled version of the Grid BLAST service 
did not require users to log in to the project portal. Instead the 
users were required to log in to their home identity provider 
and the attributes that were returned were used to enforce 
subsequent authorisation decisions. We note that it is the case 
that BRIDGES VO specific attributes could be defined and 
returned, however provided the Distinguished Name of the 
user is returned from the identity provider PERMIS is able to 
make an authorisation decision on the resources that are 
available to that user.  
This model of applying Shibboleth where the user identity 
is returned and subsequently used to make authorisation 
decisions, raises issues in the application of Shibboleth. For 
example, it is typically the case that Shibboleth usage is based 
on user anonymisation and privacy. For Grid service providers, 
this model may not be the best approach to encourage wider 
uptake by the Grid community, e.g. where fine grained/user 
specific accounting and monitoring for access to and usage of 
Grid resources is needed.   
Fig. 3 Shibboleth enabled large scale BLAST job submission (running 30,000 
jobs) across numerous large scale clusters and their monitoring 
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ccess to and usage of Grid infrastructures needs to be 
s simple as possible for end users, especially non-IT 
zed scientists. Shibboleth provides – from the end user 
tive! – a simple way in which these resources can be 
d and used. Through local institutional usernames and 
ds access to (authentication) at remote sites within the 
on can be supported. Finer grained authorization can 
lessly provided through the release and acceptance of 
essary pre-agreed security attributes. Combining this 
id server certificates (which overcome the restriction 
s possessing and managing their own user certificates) 
oaches where sets of managed certificates are used 
re allocated to users when they access the portal (via 
eth) provides a model where simple, access and usage 
rted. We are currently exploring this latter model and 
 for scenarios where the scientists might themselves 
eir own X.509 certificates, building upon MyProxy 
olutions for credential management at the back-end of 
al. Implicit to all of this is usability and making the 
security as easy to use as possible for the end user 
heed of previous lessons learned in security 
gies [31].  
ility of security infrastructures and usability of Grids 
nerally is fundamental to the success of e-Science and 
rch efforts. Why should a biologist apply for and take 
 their own X.509 certificates when all they really 
is to run BLAST on free, national HPC resources. 
upport this, a common understanding of the security 
s and their values are needed to be understood by sites 
d in a Shibboleth federation. A core set of eduPerson 
s is being explored across UK academia and should 
rsed more widely. This federated model is also based 
ust. Ensuring that sites take all appropriate security 
s for authentication and authorization is crucial. Time 
l how this level of trust is upheld (or not!) and the 
l ramifications. 
 our intention to explore Shibboleth based access to 
sources in several other domains where advanced 
 is essential including the clinical trials domain and 
ics domain in several large projects at the National e-
 Centre at the University of Glasgow [32-35]. 
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